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1Abstract
This paper analyses wage formation in the Nordic countries at the regional level by the
use of micro-data. Our results deviate systematically from the main conclusions drawn by
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). We find no stable negative relation between wages and
unemployment across regions in the Nordic labor markets once regional fixed effects are
accounted for. Wage formation at the regional level is characterized by considerable
persistence, but unemployment exerts no immediate influence on wages at the regional
level. There is no evidence of a wage curve, nor of a Phillips curve, at the regional level
in the Nordic countries.  The results are consistent with a theoretical model where central
bargaining agents determine a national wage increment, and local bargaining agents
determine wage drift.
21. INTRODUCTION
The book “The Wage Curve” by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) “..attempts to
document the existence of an empirical “law” of economics” (p. 1). They present an
impressive amount of evidence of a negative relationship between regional wages and the
level of unemployment, and argue that “What emerges from the data is a pattern linking
pay and unemployment. ... The nature of the relationship appears to be the same in
different countries. The wage curve in the United States is very similar to the wage curves
in, for example, Britain, Canada and Norway.” (p 5). Stated in quantitative terms: “In the
countries studied in this book, the estimated unemployment elasticity of pay is
approximately -0.1.” (p. 361). The competitor to the wage curve is dismissed: "The idea
of a Phillips curve may be inherently wrong. Using micro-economic data, and controlling
for fixed effects, the autoregression found in macroeconomic wage equations tends to
disappear" (p. 361).
Their conclusions gain support in a review by Card (1995) who, despite several
critical remarks, concludes: “There is a ‘wage curve’. Furthermore, the tendency for the
wage curve to show up for different kinds of workers, in different economies, and at
different times, suggests that the wage curve may be close to an “empirical law of
economics”, (p. 798). The work by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) has spurred the
interest in applying microdata to the analysis of the relation between wage formation and
labor market tightness; a discussion of the potential of microdata for this purpose is
contained in Blanchard and Katz (1997) and (1999).
It is probably fair to say that the results by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) have
served as a benchmark for subsequent empirical research in the area. It is a main
reference, and the impression is that researchers have made considerable effort to
reconcile their results to the main conclusions of Blanchflower and Oswald. The main
conclusion is that there is a stable negative relation across regions in a country between
the wage level and the unemployment level (both measured in logs). This relation is
revealed, when wages are rinsed from regional fixed effects, and represents in this sense a
transitory or short-term relationship between wages and unemployment.
3In this paper we conduct an analysis of wage formation on micro data for the
Nordic countries. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study since the wage curve
book by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) that systematically tries to make a multi-
country comparison of wage formation based on micro-data.i Our primary aim is to
establish some - hopefully robust - empirical results, which can enter into the cumulative
knowledge of the profession in this important area. The main outcome of our empirical
analysis is that no support whatsoever is obtained for the conclusion mentioned above.
Our results deviate systematically from the main conclusions drawn by Blanchflower and
Oswald, and the magnitude of the deviations signifies that unemployment does not have
the kind of role in wage formation in the Nordic labor markets as the one described by
Blanchflower and Oswald. There is no “wage curve” in the Nordic countries once fixed
region effects are introduced.
The analysis of the interplay between wage formation and unemployment has for
many years been a central theme in the econometric analysis of time series data. A main
reason for the interest in this topic is the role, which wage formation plays in determining
the amount and persistence of unemployment. The results from the time-series literature
deviate from the results of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) in the sense that the time-
series results display rather different degrees of wage flexibility across countries and
institutions. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), p. 6, cite in a note from the special
supplement to Economica 1986 the editors’ conclusions that “wages seem to be more
responsive ... in economies that are more corporatist in nature” (Economica, 1986:S19).
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) attribute the difference in the results to omission of
suitable control variables in the time series literature as well as to aggregation problems.
Obviously, our results here are at the first glance at even more odds with the conclusion
from the time-series literature, since we seem to find no wage curve at all.
While we are sympathetic to the fact that time-series analyses often lack necessary
controls and suffer from problems of aggregation, we offer another explanation for the
apparently diverging results from these two strands of analysis. The reason is simply that
the different types of studies utilize different dimensions of the variation in the underlying
data. We present below an empirical model that may provide a unifying framework for
4interpreting the results from studies based on different types of data.  Only good micro
data over a long period of time can, in a satisfactorily manner, analyze all the relevant
dimensions of this problem. But since micro data often lack long series, a
combination of time series and cross sectional analysis will be main tools for the
profession for a long time still.
While we do not find a transitory wage curve for the Nordic countries, we do find
a rather strong negative significant relationship between the long-term average regional
levels of unemployment and wages. It seems that the mechanisms operating in the US or
the UK according to Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), do affect wage levels also in our
countries. They do not, however, operate in the short-run. A main candidate for
explaining this lack of regional short-run flexibility in wages is the rather centralized
bargaining systems in our countries.
We present a model of two-tier bargaining, which is consistent with our
observations. The main assumption in the model is that the central bargaining agents
determine national wage increments on top of which the local bargaining units add wage
drift. One consequence of this model is that there are wage differences across regions, but
the short-run adjustments are rather small. The model has the implication that the
elasticity of wages with respect to local unemployment is smaller the higher the degree of
centralization in wage bargaining. Furthermore, the long-term elasticity of wages with
respect to local unemployment is more negative than the corresponding transitory effect
(keeping labor supply constant even in the long term). This model, including both central
and regional wage formation, is thus consistent with the apparently puzzling fact that our
empirical findings point to no transitory wage curve effects, while several internationally
comparative time series studies have suggested that the Nordic countries display rather
high levels of real wage flexibility. See e.g. Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988), Layard et
al. (1991) and Rødseth and Nymoen (1999).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief theoretical
framework. In section 3 we discuss, along different dimensions, the estimates of the
relationship between wages and unemployment. Section 4 presents the negative
relationship between wages and unemployment, which is obtained from the pooled data.
5This relationship disappears when regional fixed effects are introduced in section 5. In
section 6 we show how the cross-sectional co-variation between regional wages and
unemployment rates is negative in the Nordic countries. This section also contains an
empirical decomposition of the wage-unemployment elasticity obtained from the time-
series literature in the variation arising on the regional and the national level, respectively.
Section 7 attempts to reconcile our results with the ones in Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994). In section 8 we explore the dynamic aspect of wage formation, i.e., we investigate
whether there occurs persistence in regional wages in the Nordic countries. Section 9
concludes.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we set up a model of local wage formation and labor demand
interacting with a centrally determined wage settlement. The question we want to analyze
is the following: What is the role of local labor market conditions for local wages in an
economy with some degree of centralized wage bargaining? The Nordic countries are
heavily unionized, and centralized nation-wide bargaining plays an important role. It
might be such that wage flexibility at the aggregate level in such an institutional setting
co-exists with small or no wage flexibility in the regional dimension.
The main idea of this section is to pin down this idea in a formal setting, such that
a more precise discussion becomes possible. The aim is to construct a simple model,
which can be used for analyzing the relationship between unemployment rates and wage
levels at the regional and at the national level. It provides a framework for understanding
the kinds of relationship that are identified in the different estimating equations, which
are put forth and discussed in the next section of the paper, and for interpreting the
concomitant empirical results.
At the outset we specify a wage formation model at the regional level, and then
we aggregate this regional relationship in two different dimensions. First we aggregate
wages and unemployment in regions over time in order to describe the long-run
relationship between the wage level and the unemployment rate across different regions.
6Next we aggregate wages and unemployment over regions in order to describe the
relation between the wage level and the unemployment rate at the macro level.
The key assumption in our model is that the central agents agree on a national
wage increment only, taking historical relative wage levels between the regions as given.
In addition to the centralized wage setting, we assume the existence of wage drift, which
depends on local conditions. This allows for local conditions, especially labor market
tightness, to affect the relative wage level between regions.
We assume that wrt, the logarithm of the wage level at year t in region r, is
determined as follows
{ }.)1()w rtrtrt nrtcwuecy +−)−(1−(1+= θθ (1)
The wage level is determined as a weighted average between the logarithm of the
productivity level yrt and the entity in the curled parenthesis. If workers in the regions
have high bargaining power, θ, the wage level is close to the productivity of the workers.
In the converse case, where the local bargaining power is small, two additional factors
become important: the wage level determined at the national level, nrtw , and local labor
market tightness, as measured by the logarithm of the unemployment rate in the region,
urt. If the index of centralization in wage bargaining, c, is high, the centralized wage
setting plays a major role relative to local labor market tightness, and conversely, if c is
low, local unemployment plays a crucial role in determining the regional wage level. The
degree of impact of the regional unemployment rate on the wage level depends on a
constant, e.ii
The process producing the local wage equation is not modeled explicitly, but
equation (1) may be viewed as a logarithmic approximation to a wage equation derived
from a bargaining model. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) discuss such models in their
theoretical section. The formulation in (1) could be considered an amendment of the
formulation in Blanchard and Katz (1999), such that both centralized and decentralized
components in the wage formation process enter explicitly. The parameter θ  may be
interpreted as the local union's bargaining power. The terms in the curled parenthesis
7should reflect a combination of factors affecting the expected pay off for workers during a
potential conflict, see Moene (1988). Holden (1998) studies a situation where the conflict
pay off is the centrally agreed wage level. In that case, there is no influence from local
labor market conditions on the subsequent wage drift. In our framework here, we allow
for local labor market conditions to affect wage drift, and Holden's (1998) model appears
as a special case (when c=1).
The centralized bargaining is not explicitly modeled in the present context.
Instead it is assumed that the outcome of the centralized bargaining is a change in the
wage level, ∆t, which is assumed to be the same in all regions. The wage level in region
r stipulated at the national level becomes
,1 trt
n
rt ww ∆+= −
where 1−rtw  is the wage level in region r  the previous year.
When inserting the above expression for nrtw  into (1), we get
trt ccwuec ∆  + +−)−(1−(1 + = − )-(1 )-(1)1()yw 1rtrtrt θθθθ (2)
In this formulation, the coefficient to the logarithm of the unemployment rate, -(1-θ)(1-
c)e, is the wage elasticity. The lagged wage rate enters with the coefficient (1-θ) c. If this
entity is equal to one, the lagged wage level can be moved to the left-hand side of the
equation, and estimation could take place in changes in the wage level instead of wage
levels. I.e., if (1-θ) c =1, we would have a Phillips curve representation of wage formation
at the regional level.
In the empirical sections we will estimate equations where regional wage rates for
different years enter on the left-hand side and local unemployment rates and lagged
regional wages on the right-hand side, that is, we will try to identify the two elasticities in
(2) just mentioned. In addition, we will present empirical results based on wage levels
8and unemployment rates aggregated in two different dimensions: over years and over
regions.
Aggregating over years corresponds to obtaining a long-run relation from equation
(2) by assuming that the steady state conditions wrt = 1−rtw = wr, yrt = yr, 'W = ' and urt = ur
are fulfilled. This entails that the steady state regional wage level becomes
c
ceucec
)-(1-1
)-(1 ))y
w rrr
 
∆  +)−(1−(1 −)−(1−(1+ 
=
θ
θθθθ
. (3)
Thus, the long-run wage-unemployment elasticity becomes -(1-θ)(1-c)e/(1-(1-θ) c). Given
that (1-θ)c < 1, the denominator in this expression is less than one, and the long-run
elasticity is thus larger than the short-run elasticity. The present formulation of the
interplay between local and centralized wage setting entails that the long-run wage
elasticity is larger the short-run elasticity.
When aggregation takes place over regions instead of over years, a nation-wide or
macro level wage relationship corresponding to equation (2) is obtained. The nationwide
wage level at time t, tw , is consequently determined as
,)-(1 w)-(1)1()yw 1-tttt tccuec ∆  + +−)−(1−(1 + = θθθθ (4)
where the entities on the right-hand side in equation (2) are aggregated in a similar way.
To the extent that wage settlement in centralized wage negotiations is responsive
to labor market tightness, the change in the nationwide wage level, t∆ , depends on the
logarithm of the aggregate unemployment rate tu . Thus, the wage elasticity with respect
to unemployment at the macro level becomes
( ) ( )
 



∂
∆∂
−−1−1−=
∂
∂
tt
tw
u
cec
u
tθ . (5)
9That is, wage flexibility at the macro level depends on two terms. The first term in the
curled parenthesis reflects the extent of the responsiveness of wages to regional
unemployment. The next term in the curled parenthesis reflects the extent to which higher
aggregate unemployment leads to smaller increases in the centralized wage negotiations.
According to this formulation, wage flexibility at the local level necessarily shows
up at the aggregate level. The wage-unemployment elasticity -(1 -θ)(1-c)e from the
regional wage equation (2) is one of the two components in the macro-level elasticity. A
special case arises when e = 0 or c = 0, such that the wage-unemployment elasticity at the
regional level is zero. However, also this case of no wage flexibility at the regional level,
is compatible with wage flexibility at the macro level. If the change in the nationwide
wage level, t∆ , is sufficiently responsive to the aggregate unemployment rate tu , the
second term in (5) will assure wage flexibility at the macro level.
3. EMPIRICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE WAGE CURVE
The relationship between wages and unemployment has been studied empirically
along several dimensions. In this section, we present a formal model, which enables us to
distinguish in the data between the different dimensions of the wage curve. We first set
up a model allowing for three different impacts of unemployment on wages. The first is
the wage curve arising within regions from the short-term relationship between regional
unemployment and wages, the second is a long-term relationship between permanent
differences in regional unemployment and wages, and the third is the potential effect of
aggregate unemployment on average wages. We then discuss which of these effects are
picked up when implementing different types of empirical strategies.
The point of departure for the empirical analysis is the following estimating
equation, where irtw , the logarithm of the wage rate for individual i in region r in year t, is
described by individual characteristics, irtx , and the unemployment rate in the region, rtu ,
.irtirtrtrtirt vxuw +++++= βδδγα (a)
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In addition to the explanatory variables, the equation contains year dummies (time effects
identical over regions), γt, region dummies (or fixed regional effects), δr, a constant term,
α , and an error term for the individual, irtv .
This is the equation advocated by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). The estimate
of the coefficient to the unemployment rate δ, the elasticity of wages with respect to
unemployment, is their preferred estimate. It is the estimate of the elasticity of "The Wage
Curve" in the terminology of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994).
As equation (a) contains fixed regional effects on wages, any permanent
differences in wage levels between regions are contained in the regional dummies, and δ
could thus be interpreted as the transitory effect of unemployment on wages. Note that
including a regional dummy is equivalent to performing the analysis based on variables
measured as the deviation within regions from the regional specific means. In the
theoretical model of the previous section, we obtain from (2) the following expression
when subtracting out the region specific mean of the wage level
)()-(1 )()-(1)())y(ww 1rtrtrrt ∆−∆  +− +−)−(1−(1 + −=− − trrtrr cwwcuuecy θθθθ
which means that the coefficient for unemployment picks up the appropriate transitory
wage curve elasticity (1-b)(1-c)e. If productivity differentials between regions are of a
long-run nature, say from differences in natural resource endowments, they are swept out
in the fixed region effect model since, in that case, yrt = yr.
The equation also contains year dummies, which is equivalent to performing the
analysis based on deviations from year specific means. Subtracting out the aggregate
means from each year in (2) gives
)()-(1)())y(ww 11rtrttrt −− − +−)−(1−(1 + −=− trttt wwcuuecy θθθ
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The most important thing to notice is that the national wage increase, ∆ , cancels out of
the equation once we introduce year dummies. This implies that the effect of aggregate
unemployment on the centrally bargained wage increments is effectively swept out of the
analysis. This point was recognized by Blanchard and Katz (1999), who discuss the
consequences of aggregate unemployment influencing reference wages in local wage
determination.
As noted, any permanent differences in wage levels between regions are not
described in (a) but are contained in regional dummies. As a conceptual exercise, the
permanent or long-term differences in the regional wage levels, as evaluated by the
regional dummies, δr, could be explained in an equation. Consider the following
relationship between the regional fixed effects as explained by the logarithm of the
average unemployment rate in the regions .ru , average individual characteristics in the
regions .rx , and region specific variables rZ  like natural resources, climate etc.
rrrrr cZxbuda εδ ++++= .. (b)
The expected sign of the coefficient d to the unemployment rate is positive, if a region's
permanent high unemployment is compensated by higher wages. That is, if the
combination between wage levels and unemployment results in a smaller income level
than in other regions, migration out of the region will prevail until the expected income
level has been equalized. This is the line of thought in the Harris-Todaro (1990)
migration model. But the long-term relationship could arise from other mechanisms as
well, from rent sharing or local bargaining as discussed in the previous theoretical section
indicating a negative long-run relation between the regional wage level and the regional
unemployment rate was obtained.
Analogous to (b), the development in the wage level over time could be
considered as a macro-relationship of the following form
12
,.. ttttt ECGxBuDA ++++=γ (c)
which relates the time-specific effect, tγ , to the logarithm of the average unemployment
rate across regions at time t, tu. . In addition, the equation contains average individual
characteristics tx.  and relevant time specific variables tG , e.g. the oil price or changes in
the bargaining system. For the Nordic countries, we may think of D, the aggregate wage
curve effect, as arising from the centralized bargaining system: The central bargaining
units take the average unemployment rate into consideration in the bargaining process.
Note that the coefficient to a variable like tu.  would not have been identified if it had
been included in equation (6), which contains time dummies.
We now have a framework which allows for a short term effect of local
unemployment on regional wages, δ; a long term effect capturing the impact of
permanent differences in local unemployment on regional wages, d; and finally an
aggregate wage curve operating at the national level only, D.
It is worth noting that the literature on centralization and real wage flexibility (e.g.
Layard et al. 1991) should primarily be interpreted as a statement about D, rather than
about δ which is the primary concern of Blanchflower and Oswald.
In the following sections we explore the relationship between wages and
unemployment in the Nordic countries along these different dimensions. We first present
estimates from the pooled individual level data, i.e., estimates of (a) excluding the fixed
regional effects, γt. Then the estimates of (a) including fixed regional effects are
presented.
The cross-sectional interplay between wages and unemployment is obtained from
the variation between region specific averages: the logarithm of the wage rate, .rw , the
logarithm of the unemployment rate .ru , and average personal characteristics .rx . The
averages are obtained either by including the mean of the year dummies in the pooled
data sets or by averaging the regional dummies from year specific regressions. We get
13
,... rrrbetweenrbetweenr cZxuaw νβδγ +++++= (d)
which produces between region estimates. Now, inserting equation (b) into equation (a)
and taking the region specific mean shows that
,dbetween += δδ (e)
which implies that the cross-sectional variation, betweenδ , is obtained as the gross of the
transitory effect, δ , and the permanent effect, ,d of unemployment on wages.iii
Finally, we consider the wage-unemployment elasticity obtained from the analysis
of time-series analysis which can be decomposed in an analogous way. The standard
model in most recent time-series studies is a regression of the logarithm of the nation-
wide wage level tw.  on the logarithm of the nation-wide unemployment rate tu.  and
different controls
ttttimettimet uCGxuw ++++= ... βδα (f)
Inserting (c) into (a) and taking the average per unit of time shows that:
.Dtime += δδ (g)
This implies that it is possible to obtain an estimate of D by calculating the
difference between the time unit estimates and the within region estimates. Since the
above model (f) is the method adopted in most time series studies, we may interpret the
difference between the time series estimates and our fixed-region effects as an estimate of
the aggregate wage curve effect operating at the national level. This point offers an
explanation of the differences in wage flexibility results obtained from time-series studies
and conventional micro-level studies.
14
The decomposition in (g) corresponds to the analogous decomposition (5) in the
theoretical section. On the left-hand side we have the macro effect of unemployment on
wages, which is decomposed into two components on the right-hand side. Firstly the
effect at the regional level and secondly the effect at the national level.
Accordingly, observing a high degree of wage flexibility in time series studies is
compatible with observing no wage flexibility in the fixed region effects model, once we
realize that the time series observation is the sum of the transitory and aggregate effects
of unemployment on wages.
Finally, note that the G-variable in (f) may involve various kinds of dynamic
specifications, such that it is fully possible that both the Phillips curve and the wage curve
give a correct description of the wage formation process. This point, as recognized by
Blanchard and Katz (1998), is concealed in the wage curve literature through the use of
dummy variables for time.
4. WAGES CURVES FROM POOLED SAMPLES
The first results we present are wage-unemployment elasticities for data pooled
over all years of observations. The observation unit is individuals in different regions and
years contrasted against unemployment rates in the corresponding regions and years. The
pooled sample results are mixtures of the elasticities in the different dimensions that will
be considered in more detail in the next sections. We report results for the sample split up
into private sector employees and public sector employees and explain why we
concentrate on private sector employees only in the rest of the paper.
Formally, the pooled sample elasticities are obtained by applying equation (a) in
the previous section without the regional dummies, rδ . Because both wages and
unemployment are in logs, the interpretation of the coefficient to the unemployment rate,
δ, is the elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment. Implicit in this formulation is
the assumption that the elasticity is constant regardless of the level of unemployment.
15
One advantage of the logarithmic form is that it facilitates comparisons between
countries, since the results are invariant to currency differences.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) find the by now famous estimate of δ so
prevalent, both in time and space, that they almost propose it as an empirical “law”: the
elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment is -0.1. This implies that a 10 percent
increase in regional unemployment, e.g. from 5 to 5.5 percent, decreases wages by one
percent. Correspondingly, a doubling of the unemployment rate induces a drop in wages
by 10 percent.
For the Nordic countries Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) conduct an
investigation for Norway only. They report an elasticity of -0.08 as their preferred
estimate. For Sweden they merely quote a result of -0.06 from another study.iv In a
subsequent section we will discuss the procedure followed by Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994) for Norway and try to reconcile their results with the ones presented here.
Table 1 reports the main results from estimating wage curves for the Nordic
countries on pooled sample data.v The control variables (the x’es) include years of
education, experience, seniority, gender, occupational dummies and industry dummies.
The inclusion of year dummies implies that the impact of inflation is swept out.
Table 1 about here
In the public sector the wage curve effect is very small in all Nordic countries
compared to the magnitude stated in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). The highest
estimate is the one for Finland (-0.04). For Norway and Sweden the point estimate is not
significantly different from zero. We may thus conclude that the regional variation in
public sector wages is not very sensitive to local labor market conditions. This result is
not surprising since the bargaining system is rather centralized in the public sector.
Furthermore the norm of equal pay for equal work is particularly strong in this sector.
There is altogether very low regional variation in public sector wages in the Nordic
countries.vi
16
The lack of a relationship between regional wages and unemployment in the
public sector obviously affects the estimate for the whole labor market, which is
contained in the last rows of Table 1. In all countries, the elasticity of wages with respect
to regional unemployment is smaller for the combined sample of the public and the
private sector than for the private sector alone. As we in the following will argue that the
wage curve elasticities reported by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) are overstated, we
focus entirely on private sector wages in the subsequent analysis.
Using the pooled sample data, the size of the estimated wage-unemployment
elasticity in the private sector is -0.06 for Denmark, -0.10 for Finland, -0.02 for Iceland, -
0.06 for Norway and -0.05 for Sweden. Thus, the magnitude of the elasticity for Finland
corresponds to the ones in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), while the elasticity for
Denmark, Norway and Sweden is about half of this magnitude. For Iceland it is even
smaller.
With respect to evaluating the significance of the wage elasticities in Table 1 a
caveat is necessary, as the number of regions (and consequently the variation in regional
unemployment rates) is considerably less than the number of workers (i.e., the number of
observations). If the errors for the wage rates of different workers are correlated within
regions, the classical assumptions for the estimating equations are not fulfilled. The
consequence is that the standard errors are not correct, and it is likely that the standard
errors reported in Table 1 are too small, see Moulton (1986). Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994) report many results on individual observations like the ones in Table 1 without
correction of the possible bias of the standard error. However, they also apply a method to
take this into account, namely an aggregation of wage observations to one observation per
region, and this is also done later in this paper.
5. THE DISAPPEARING WAGE CURVE: FIXED REGION
EFFECTS RESULTS
The wage curve estimated for the Nordic countries in the previous section
dissolves once we introduce regional fixed effects. This is an important result,
17
contradicting the claims of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). A fixed effects estimation
is their preferred procedure, and deviations from the standard wage elasticity result of -
0.10 are often contributed to lack of data, which renders fixed effects estimation
impossible. The relationship between regional wage levels and unemployment rates in the
Nordic countries is thus of a long-term nature rather than a relationship between short-
term levels.
Formally, the equation to be estimated on individual data is the one from the
previous section where the regional dummies, rδ , are added to the equation, i.e., equation
(a) above. These dummies identify the potential regional wage level that is fixed over
time, and are, accordingly, a measure of “permanent” differentials in wage levels across
regions. Running an ordinary least squares regression of this model specification will
effectively sweep out all these “permanent” differences between regions. In other words,
the effect of unemployment levels on wages is measured based on the variation within
each region only, and the result may be interpreted as the effect of “transitory” changes in
unemployment.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) stress the importance of using fixed-region
effects models to investigate the relationship between regional unemployment and wages.
Theoretically, in a long-run migration equilibrium, the relationship between permanent
unemployment and wages should be positive. If a region has high unemployment, higher
wages are required to compensate for this unfortunate feature of the local labor market. In
the short-run, in contrast, wage curve mechanisms are supposed to apply. Blanchflower
and Oswald find that the long-run relationship between wages and unemployment is
indeed positive in the US, while they do not find this to be the case in the UK. A positive
long-run correlation between wages and unemployment will tend to bias the results
obtained from the pooled sample downward (towards zero) and they, therefore, argue that
a fixed-region effect model is the correct specification.
Table 2 reports the main fixed-region effects estimated for the Nordic countries.
The first row displays estimates from a fixed region effect model based on regional
unemployment rates. In this specification, all “permanent” variation is swept out as
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described above, and the coefficients reflect “transitory” effects only. All wage elasticities
are small and insignificant.
Table 2 about here
In the next two rows, we report results using unemployment rates at the
municipality and the commuting area level, with control for region. This implies that in
addition to transitory variation around the regional mean, the permanent variation
between, respectively, municipalities and commuting areas within each region is also
accounted for. The wage elasticity remains small and insignificant, except for Denmark.
The result for Denmark should, however, be viewed in light of the extremely large
number of observations (more than 400 thousand) and the very low point estimate of less
than 2 percent.
Accordingly it seems fair to conclude that the wage curve for the Nordic countries
disappears once we introduce fixed region effects. The results are unambiguous: we do
not find significant elasticities of wages with respect to regional unemployment once
permanent differences across regions are accounted for.
We next present results based on region-cross-year specific averages. We
calculate region-specific averages for each year included in the data set and choose
instead of individuals these region-cross-year averages as our unit of observation. OLS
regressions based on these averages, including regional dummies, produce more correct
estimates of the standard error of the coefficients as the number of observations are now
the same as for the regional unemployment rate appearing in our data (see, e.g., Moulton
(1986) and the discussion in Card (1995))vii.
In Table 3 we report results from region-cross-year cell means. We note that for
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, the fixed region effects estimates confirm our
previous results in Table 2 of no transitory wage curve effects in the Nordic countries.
The coefficients range from –0.018 for Finland to 0.012 for Sweden, with only the Danish
coefficient being significantly different from zero, but again extremely small (-0.0084).
The result for Iceland is surprising, implying a transitory wage curve effect of minus 6
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percent. This result combined with the result in Table 2 warrants some further
investigation.
Table 3 about here
To the extent that the error terms for individuals within regions are correlated one
would expect an increase in the standard errors when comparing the first row in Table 2
with the standard errors in Table 3. For Finland and Sweden there is actually a certain
increase in the standard errors, while the standard errors for Denmark and Norway
decrease.
It seems that the Nordic wage curve estimated from cross section data (as reported
from the pooled sample in the previous section) is the outcome of a negative relationship
between the level of wages and long term differences in unemployment rates across
regions. Transitory fluctuations in relative unemployment do not induce changes in
relative wages between regions. It may, of course, be argued that the lack of a transitory
wage curve effect could be due to too little within region variation in unemployment.viii
However, our failure to detect a transitory wage curve effect cannot simply be explained
by large standard errors relative to the magnitude of the point estimates. Apart from
Iceland, all our point estimates are extremely small and none of the estimates are within 2
standard errors of the benchmark elasticity of -0.10. We find it reasonable to attribute the
apparent lack of regional wage flexibility compared to the US and the UK to the
centralized bargaining systems in force in the Nordic countries.
The results of the previous section showed that the pooled sample estimates of the
wage-unemployment elasticity in the Nordic countries were mostly below the preferred
estimate of -0.10 in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). The reason for these low
elasticities is not that the short-run elasticities are drawn downwards when confounded by
positive long-run elasticities. On the contrary, the short-run elasticities turn out to be
close to zero and, consequently, we must expect the long-run elasticities to be negative in
the Nordic countries. This is further explored in the following section.
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6. LONG-RUN AND AGGREGATE RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN WAGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
The long-run relationship between regional wages and unemployment in the
Nordic countries has to be different from that obtained from data for the US and the UK
given the results in the previous sections. We present some estimates of the more
permanent relationship between regional wages and unemployment, utilizing “between
region” estimates of the coefficients as discussed in section 3.
Moreover, the lack of wage flexibility in the short-run seems to contrast sharply
with the real wage flexibility reported for several of the Nordic countries in time-series
studies. We therefore conclude this section by showing more formally that wage rigidity
across regions may very well be consistent with aggregate wage flexibility, mainly
because the two methodologies draw on different dimensions of variation in the data. The
conclusion is that real wage flexibility in the Nordic countries is obtained through the
centralized bargaining system reacting on aggregate employment conditions, rather than
by local wage setting adjusting to local labor market conditions.
Table 4 reports the elasticity between two different measures of the average
region-specific wage level and the region-specific unemployment rate. For these
regressions, we have aggregated our pooled data to merely one observation per region.
The first row gives the results from a regression of the mean log regional wage on the log
unemployment rate (including averages of the year dummies). For Iceland, we find a
positive, but insignificant elasticity of 0.014. For the other countries, the elasticity of
regional wages is negative ranging from an insignificant -0.06 for Denmark to a highly
significant -0.25 for Norway.
Table 4 about here
The next row reports results from a regression of the mean log wage residual on
the log unemployment rate. The log wage residuals are the region specific means of the
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residuals from pooled individual wage regressions including years of schooling,
experience, experience squared, seniority, gender, industry and occupational dummies as
well as year dummies. Again Iceland displays a positive, but insignificant wage elasticity.
The estimated elasticity for Denmark is slightly higher in this specification, -0.07, but still
not significant. For the remaining countries, we find a significant negative relationship
between regional wages and unemployment.
These coefficients capture both the short- and the long-term interaction between
wages and unemployment, and can thus be interpreted as a mix of the short- and long-
term wage curves reported so far. For Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, all
showing short-term wage elasticities close to zero (Tables 2 and 3), the conclusion seems
to be the following:
A wage curve effect is discernible also in Denmark, Finland, Norway and
Sweden. Higher regional unemployment induces a lower regional wage level. However,
this relationship is not working in the short-run, but rather in the longer run. As stated
above, we attribute the lack of short-term wage flexibility to the rather centralized wage
setting systems of these economies. The observed long-term relationship, nevertheless,
warrants a more careful discussion.
In contrast to US results, we find no traces of a migration equilibrium in these
four countries, that is, a positive association between wage and unemployment in the long
run. According to Card (1995), p. 789, "... average levels of unemployment across states
are weakly positively correlated with average wages, ..." in the US. The evidence for the
US points unambiguously towards such a positive cross-sectional correlation, but the
evidence is indirect, and the references cited in the present paper do unfortunately not
seem to contain quantitative assessments for the US comparable to the one for the Nordic
countries in Table 4.ix Card (1995) continues "For the British data, the addition of region
dummies rarely affects the estimated wage curve elasticities, perhaps reflecting the grater
degree of "permanence" in the geographic patters of British unemployment ....".x Also the
Nordic countries are characterized by a high degree of permanence in relative
performance across regions, which could be taken as an indication of equilibrium forces
of labor mobility working slower in these countries than in the highly mobile US.
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The lack of such a positive cross-sectional relationship between wages and
unemployment could thus be due to a lower degree of worker mobility within the Nordic
countries, especially compared to that of the US. However, we are not aware of any other
empirical evidence to support this assertion.xi
For Iceland, however, we do find a negative transitory wage curve in Table 3,
whereas the positive, albeit not significantly so, coefficient in Table 4 could indicate that
there might be a positive long term relationship between wages and unemployment in
Iceland. In line with theory, this may be the result of a more mobile work force in Iceland
than in the rest of the Nordic countries.xii
For Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, the question remains: how do the
long-term regional wage differentials arise if they do not add up from short-term
adjustments? Our findings could of course be due to some omitted variable, producing a
negative correlation between regional wages and unemployment in the long-run. It seems
nonetheless reasonable to suggest that, in line with the theoretical model, the forces
working in more decentralized economies, such as rent sharing mechanisms (and
efficiency wages), are present in the Nordic countries as well, but with a slower speed of
adjustment due to the fact that a significant part of the wage change arises from the
centralized level. Combined with low regional mobility, this may produce a long-term
negative correlation between regional unemployment and wages. Moreover, this is the
correlation that shows up as wage curves for Norway and Sweden in Blanchflower and
Oswald (1994) as discussed in the next section.
Simultaneously, the evidence from the time series literature, both from our
countries and from international cross country studies, points to rather high levels of real
wage flexibility in the Nordic labor market. How can we reconcile our findings with this
observation?  The answer might simply be, that the wage flexibility of the Nordic
countries arises at the aggregate level as a response to aggregate unemployment, while the
wage flexibility of the US originates from wage flexibility at the local level.
We end this section by presenting a table summarizing the results of the Nordic
wage curves along the dimensions analyzed above. Panel A of Table 5 presents the
difference between the elasticity estimated on region specific averages (Table 4) and the
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fixed region effects estimates (Table 2). As discussed above this difference represents an
unbiased estimate of the coefficient d in equation (b), i.e. the long-term regional wage
curve effect.xiii In the notation of section 3, equation (e), we find d as the difference
between betweenδ  and δ . We find a significant and large long-run regional wage curve for
Finland, Norway and Sweden. Also for Denmark the wage elasticity across regions is
negative, but insignificant. For Iceland we observe a positive but insignificant long-term
relationship between wages and unemployment.xiv
Table 5 about here
Panel B of Table 5 states the time-series estimates for Denmark, Finland, Norway
and Sweden obtained in Nymoen et al. (1998). This is a recent investigation on wage
formation at the macro level conducted in another Nordic project. The reported estimates
are long-run estimates of the elasticity of wages with respect to total unemployment
(including labor market program participants) from error-correction models using
manufacturing wages from 1960 to 1994. Since both the sample and the specification are
different from ours, the calculated "aggregate wage curve" also reported in the table
should be interpreted with caution.
The exercise in this part of the table corresponds to equation (g) in section 3. The
time series estimates of the first row of Table 5, Panel B, correspond to timeδ  on the left-
hand side of equation (g). The second row contains the coefficients of the regional fixed
effects model corresponding to δ , the first term on the right-hand side of equation (g).
The last row corresponds to the second term, D, on the right-hand side of equation (g),
and is calculated as the difference between the first and the second row. This term reflects
the variation between the wage level and unemployme nt common to regions and is
therefore labeled the "National wage curve". In terms of the bargaining model of section
2, it is to be interpreted as the effect arising from centralized bargaining. In other words,
Panel B of Table 5 decomposes the aggregate time series estimates of wage elasticities
into the wage elasticity, which is in focus in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), and a
response of wages to unemployment at the national level.
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According to the time-series study, the wage-unemployment elasticity is of about
the same magnitude in three of the countries, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, where the
point estimates are insignificantly different from the value -0.15, while the estimate for
Finland is somewhat lower (-0.05). The components of this variation arising from
regional variation in wages are small in size according to the figures in row 2. Instead, the
major variation in aggregate times series stems from the variation in wages and
unemployment that is common across regions (third row of Table 5, Panel B). In other
words, the wage flexibility in the Nordic countries arises at the national level, not at the
regional level.
7. RECONCILING THE EVIDENCE
As we have found no support for the empirical results reported in Blanchflower
and Oswald (1994) it is worth looking in more detail at their results for the only Nordic
country included in their study. Norway is explicitly mentioned in the beginning of "The
Wage Curve" book as a country with a wage curve "very similar" to the one in the United
States, as mentioned in the introduction of this paper. The book contains one table for
Norway, Table 7.17, which presents 6 elasticity estimates. The data is a survey for the
years 1989, 1990 and 1991 and contains a total of 2,599 observations in the pooled
sample. Different controls are included in the estimations, which do not take clustering at
the regional level into account.
The first three estimates are elasticities for each of the sample years. The forth is a
pooled sample estimate including time dummies for these three years combined, which
yields an elasticity of -0.10 with a t-statistic of 2.64. The fifth estimate is a fixed effects
estimate with regional dummies, and this yields an insignificant wage elasticity of -0.01
as the t-statistic is 0.12. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), p. 335, then note that "Only
four of these regional dummies were found to be significantly different from the
remaining fifteen dummies".xv The sixth and last estimate is accordingly an estimate,
which is obtained when only these four regional dummies are included, and this yields an
elasticity of -0.08 with a t-value of 2.19. This estimate is the preferred one - it enters as
25
the estimate for Norway in the introductory article Blanchflower and Oswald (1995),
which contains a table, "Wage Curves in 12 Nations", presenting one wage-
unemployment elasticity per nation. The authors conclude that "The estimated
unemployment elasticity of pay for Norway is, according to the tables, consistent with
estimates for the other countries examined in the book", see Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994), p. 334.
These quantitative results reported by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) for
Norway actually do not seem to be at variance with the ones presented in the present
more detailed study for Norway and the other Nordic countries. The pooled sample result
for Norway is -0.60, which is within the 5 percent confidence interval for the point
estimate of -0.10 by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). The fixed effects result for
Norway is 0.00, which is almost identical to the -0.01 in Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994).
The reason for the difference between the pooled sample results and the fixed
effects results is a correlation between the regional dummies and the regional
unemployment rates. When most of the regional dummies are deleted, and only a minor
fraction retained in the estimation, then it is natural that the resulting estimate of -0.08 is
closer to the pooled sample result than to the fixed effects result.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the outcome of this exercise for
Norway with an analogous one for the US on the basis of the information in Blanchflower
and Oswald (1994). In the US fixed effects estimations, a full set of dummies
corresponding to either 50 states or different regions in the various data sources seem to
be used throughout the book. Now, it is likely that a fair share of the US states has an
average wage that is not far away from the average wage rate in the US after controlling
for unemployment and individual characteristics like experience, schooling, gender,
marital status, race, private sector, part time, and industrial affiliation. A qualified
conjecture is, that deleting the dummies for those states, which do not have a wage rate
that is significantly different from the average wage rate in the US, most likely will pull
the fixed effects wage elasticity of -0.10 towards the pooled sample result, that is, towards
zero.xvi Omitting some of the devise that removes the positive cross-sectional variation in
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the data for the United States must necessarily bring parts of this variation back into the
data.
The final estimate for Norway in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) is thus based
on a procedure that is not applied in the case of the United States.xvii When applied on
Norwegian data, the methodology for obtaining the "wage curve" estimate for the United
States produces an estimate indistinguishable from zero. So in our view it is reasonable to
conclude, that the evidence put forward in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) about the
short-run regional variation between wages and unemployment for Norway is actually in
accordance with the evidence in this paper: there is none.xviii
This also applies to different subgroups of workers. One of the innovative features
in the work of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) is that they use micro-data to trace the
different responsiveness of wages on unemployment for subgroups on the labor market.
For example, the wage flexibility for less educated seems to be larger than for workers
with higher education. This seems to hold also for younger workers relative to older
workers. This evidence of heterogeneity on the labor market is for example contained in a
table with wage elasticities for subgroups in the review by Card (1995), a table that has
recently been reproduced and applied in Browning et al. (1999).
It is conceivable that such heterogeneity of wage responses for different worker
subgroups is also present in the Nordic countries. However, such heterogeneity is not
present in the short-run regional wage variation, i.e., after controlling for fixed regional
effects. The average wage curve elasticity for workers with less and with more education
combined is zero, it is zero for younger and older workers combined, and tables for wage
curve elasticities for subgroups in the Nordic countries contain nothing but zeros, for
details see Albæk et al. (1999).
8. DYNAMIC ASPECTS OF REGIONAL WAGE FORMATION
Compared to the various estimates reported for the US and the UK, it seems that
wage formation in the Nordic countries does not show the same responsiveness to local
labor market conditions as approximated by the regional unemployment rate. If the
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unemployment rate does a reasonably good job in capturing the influence from economic
conditions and if movements in the wage rate are not substantially influenced by other
factors, the expectation would be that the wage rate in the Nordic countries shows a high
degree of regional persistence.
Persistence implies that if the wage level is high in one period, it is likely to be high also
in the next period. A natural way to investigate whether or not this is the case is to
include the wage level in the previous period in an equation describing the wage level in
the current period. As noted by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) this method also
provides us with a test of the wage curve specification versus the Phillips curve, i.e.,
whether the left-hand side of the wage equation should be in levels or changes in levels
(see also the discussion in section 2).
Our Danish data contains observations from the largest number of years (12
years). In Table 6 we report results from various wage specifications including lagged
wages for Denmark. The first two columns report results from an equation for the wage
level, which includes the regional wage lagged one period and regional unemployment.
The wage variable is the regional average of the residuals after controlling for individual
characteristics. Also, the regression is weighted by the number of sample individuals in
each region and year.
Table 6 about here
In column 1, which does not include regional dummies, the lagged wage level
comes out with the coefficient 0.9750, which indicates a very high level of persistence.
The coefficient of the unemployment variable is negative but very small and not
significantly different from zero. In the next column, regional dummies are included as
well. The coefficient of the lagged wage variable drops, but is still highly significant and
rather large (0.52). The magnitude of the coefficient still points to fairly high persistence
in wage levels, although not to the same degree as in the previous equation excluding the
regional dummies.
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These results are in sharp contrast with one of the main findings in Blanchflower
and Oswald (1994). Their equations comprising regional dummies and a lagged wage
variable produced a coefficient close to zero for both the US and the UK. Consequently,
they concluded that the Phillips curve specification, which is the traditional specification
in the analysis of wage formation on time series data, is not a valid specification in the
analysis of wage formation on micro data. In order to distinguish the analysis of wage
formation on micro data from the analysis on macro data, they concocted the term "wage
curve", the title of their book, a curve that was supposed to replace the Phillips curve. As
is evident from the present results this claim is not supported by the evidence obtained
from Danish data.
High absolute values of the coefficient for the lagged wage variable, which favors
the Phillips curve in contrast to the wage curve, are also reported in Blanchard and Katz
(1997). They used US wage data, while Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) worked on US
income data. In order to reconcile the divergent results, Blanchard and Katz (1997)
replicated the analysis on CPS income data and obtained a small coefficient for the lagged
income variable. This lead Blanchard and Katz (1997), p. 64, to make the conjecture that
the use of income instead of wages was the reason for the small coefficient of the lagged
endogenous variable obtained by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). Or, stated differently,
measurement error in the dependent variable, when using income instead of wages, might
cause problems in a dynamic specification of the wage formation process, resulting in a
low estimate of the coefficient for the lagged income variable.
In order to shed further light on this issue, the analysis in columns 1 and 2 of
Table 6 is replicated in the next two columns, with wages replaced by income. According
to the results in column 3 with the regional dummies omitted, the persistence in income is
of about the same magnitude as the persistence in wages (column 1). However, when
regional dummies are added in column 4, the coefficient of the lagged income variable
drops to 0.37. Although the drop in size when comparing column 2 and column 4 is about
two standard errors, the coefficient of the lagged income variable is still significantly
different from zero and larger than the ones reported from US data. Persistence prevails
according to the Danish data, also when income is used in place of wages.
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The difference between income and wages, the measurement error, originates
from the number of working hours. In the last two columns of the table, therefore,
persistence in working hours is investigated. According to the results in column 5 the
degree of persistence in working hours is quite high in the different regions. However,
most of this effect is picked up by the regional dummies as indicated by the results in
column 6.xix
It is important to note, that the coefficients of the lagged right-hand side variable
in Table 6 are biased towards zero, when the regional fixed effects are included. The bias
is larger the smaller the number of time periods. In this context twelve years is a
reasonably large number so it is conceivable that the bias does not account for all the
difference between the coefficients estimated with and without the fixed effects.xx It is
worth noting that Blanchard and Katz (1997) obtain coefficients close to one to the
lagged wage rate on US data, even after having included regional fixed effects. For the
UK, Brian Bell (1997) also reports significant autoregression in wages.xxi
The Danish data is the only data set, which allows us to trace the adjustment
process in wage formation over a comparatively long time period. For the other countries
we have observations for a smaller number of years, and for Finland and Norway the
observations are not adjacent, there is a two-year lag in the observations.
In Table 7 we report lagged specifications from Finland, Iceland and Norway as
well (Sweden is omitted in this table, as there are 10 years between the two observations
available).xxii The Finnish and Norwegian data consist of observations from three points
in time, with two years between each survey. Hence, we first do a replication of the three-
point-two-year sample frame of these two countries on the Danish data set to see if our
specification gives robust results with different sampling schemes. The first column in
Table 7 replicates the results for Denmark for the whole sampling period stated in Table
6. The second and third columns report the results for two data sets for Denmark,
replicating the Finnish and Norwegian sampling scheme (i.e., three years with a two-year
lag between the observations). The first row in the table reports the coefficient and the
standard error to the lagged wage in the estimating equation. The second row shows the
one-year-effect calculated as the square root of the coefficient in the first row in the cases
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where there is a two-year lag among the observations in the data. The calculated one-year
effects for Denmark come very close to the coefficient reported in the first column.xxiii
We thus proceed by including the results for Finland and Norway, even though the
sampling plan differs from that of Denmark and Iceland.
Table 7 about here
It turns out that for all four countries the lagged wage coefficient is significant and
rather large, ranging from 0.73 (Iceland) to close to 1 (Denmark).xxiv This clearly
indicates a high level of regional wage persistence in the Nordic labor markets. We thus
reject the wage curve specification, a finding, which is in accordance with our
observation from the fixed region effects model in the previous section.
The coefficients to the lagged wage rate are fairly close to one and one might
therefore consider accepting the competitor to the wage curve, the Phillips curve.xxv On
the other hand, the coefficient of log unemployment is extremely small and insignificant,
which leads us to reject the Phillips curve model as well. All in all, not much happens
with regional relative wages in the Nordic countries in the short-run.
This is in contrast to the results for the US in Blanchard and Katz (1997) where
the coefficient to unemployment is significantly different from zero in equations
containing lagged regional wage rates. For the UK, the coefficient to unemployment is on
the borderline of significance when autoregression in wage rates is taken into account
according to Bell (1997).
The result presented in the present paper does nevertheless not imply that a
Phillips curve description of the wage formation process in the Nordic countries can be
rejected. The unemployment coefficient in Table 6 and Table 7 cannot be compared to
corresponding coefficients based on time series data. As discussed in the previous
section, the aggregate time series variation in the micro data has been purged as a
consequence of including year dummies. Again this leads us to conclude that the
observed real wage flexibility of the Nordic countries arises from reactions at the national
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level on aggregate labor market conditions, probably due to the rather centralized systems
of wage formation.
9. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analyzed wage formation at the regional level in the Nordic
countries by the use of micro-data. The point of departure was the by now famous study
by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), establishing a negative relationship between wage
levels and unemployment rates across regions and over time. This main result from their
micro-level analysis they call “The Wage Curve”.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) estimate the elasticity of wages with respect to
unemployment to be around minus 10 percent for a large number of countries. They argue
that this wage flexibility operates on a short-term basis, indicating that also transitory
changes in regional unemployment rates translate into wage changes. This is to be kept
distinct from the long-run relationship between regional wages and unemployment that
arises from a migration equilibrium, where higher permanent levels of unemployment
require higher wage levels to compensate for worse local labor market conditions. Our
findings concerning the Nordic wage curve can be summarized as follows.
At the outset we reported, for all five Nordic countries, wage curve results for
pooled data with regional fixed effects omitted. The estimated elasticities of private
sector wages with respect to unemployment range from minus 5 to minus 10 percent, with
Finland showing the strongest wage response to regional differences in unemployment.
Public sector wages are not sensitive to local labor market conditions, for which reason
we confined all subsequent analyses to private sector wages.
Hereafter, fixed region effects were introduced in the analysis. Basically this
means that all persistent regional differences in wage levels and unemployment rates are
swept out, and the analysis is performed only on the year-to-year changes in wages and
unemployment across regions. The results are thus to be interpreted as capturing the
dependency of wages on transitory changes in regional unemployment rates. Indeed,
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according to Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) this is the appropriate approach when
trying to explore the wage curve.
After having controlled for fixed regional effects we are no longer able to detect a
wage curve in any of the Nordic countries. In other words, transitory changes in regional
unemployment rates do not seem to translate into changes in relative wages across
regions. This implies that the conclusion put forward by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994)
regarding the prevalence and stability of a wage curve in a large number of countries does
not stand against closer scrutiny for the Nordic countries. The Nordic wage curves simply
do not survive the introduction of fixed regional effects.
Moreover, it seems that the long-term relationship between regional wages and
unemployment is negative rather than positive. This indicates that the simplest version of
the migration-equilibrium model does not hold in our countries, and could suggest that
local productivity and labor market conditions have lasting effects on relative wages.
The evidence on wage formation in the Nordic countries put forward in the
present paper does actually not seem to be at variance with the limited analysis for
Norway contained in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). In order to obtain the standard
elasticity result of -0.10 for this country, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) adopted a
procedure, which is not applied elsewhere in their study.
Finally, we considered persistence in wage formation by including the lagged
wage rate in the equations. In the results presented by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994)
this variable had a coefficient close to zero, which they interpreted to lend further support
for the existence of a wage curve and, consequently, lead them to reject the Phillips curve.
For the Nordic countries, in contrast, the lagged wage rate comes out with a coefficient,
which is significantly different from zero. This points to considerable persistence in
regional wage formation in the Nordic countries. However, the estimates of the lagged
wage variable are not high enough to support a Phillips curve relation, either.
These negative conclusions with respect to the short-run impact of unemployment
on wage flexibility at the regional level in the Nordic countries do not entail that there is
no wage flexibility whatsoever in our countries. The inclusion of year dummies in the
analysis of wage formation at the micro level effectively purges any effects from
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unemployment to wages at the macro level. Hence, flexibility in wage formation at the
macro level might very well co-exist together with a modest role of unemployment in the
regional dimension.
Our results are consistent with our theoretical model, where a central union
determines national wage changes in order to keep a target-level of aggregate
unemployment, and there is local wage drift affected by local labor market conditions.
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Appendix. Data and sample statistics
The estimation of the wage curve is based on comparable data sets for the Nordic
countries. The data are representative for the private (excluding agricultural and fishing)
sector as well as the public sector and the key variables used in the estimations are
defined in a comparable way. The hourly wage is calculated as the worker's earnings
divided by the reported working hours. For all countries schooling, experience and
seniority are measured in years and the industry classification follows the ISIC
nomenclature.
The data for Denmark and Iceland are from registers, whereas the data for
Finland, Norway and Sweden come from surveys and are mostly self-reported. However,
for Finland the information on earnings and completed education is from registers. Table
A1 provides more detailed information on the definitions of some variables.
The sample for Denmark is drawn randomly from a labor market data base (IDA)
containing register data collected by Statistics Denmark. The sample used includes
34,723 workers in 1993. The Finnish sample for 1993 include 2,468 employees from the
Labour Force Survey, which is a random sample from the whole population conducted by
Statistics Finland. The Icelandic data is a sample drawn from administrative data
collected by the association of Icelandic employers. The sample used includes 12,799
employees in 1992. The data for Norway come from the Norwegian Study of
Organizations and Employees (NSOE) from 1989 and 1993, and from the Level of Living
Survey (LLS) for 1991, both conducted by the Statistics Norway. The sample includes
5,516 employees for the years 1989, 1991 and 1993. The Swedish data come from the
Level of Living Survey (LNU) conducted by the Swedish Institute for Social Research
and Statistics Sweden (SCB). The observations consist of a randomly selection of
individuals between 16 and 76 years and the sample used includes 3,198 employees for
the year 1991.
The unemployment rates at county and municipality level origin from the
following sources. For Denmark the unemployment rates at county and local levels come
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from register data collected in November each year and published by Statistics Denmark.
The county-specific unemployment rates for Finland reflect the average annual level as
calculated by Statistics Finland, whereas the municipality unemployment rates refer to
Ministry of Labor’s unemployment data for October in each year. For Iceland the
unemployment rate at county and local level is from the National Economic Institute of
Iceland. Regional unemployment rates for Norway are for the main part taken from
Fjortoft (1995) based on figures from the Directory of Labour (Arbejdsdirektoratet). The
corresponding data from Sweden come from the National Labour Market Board in
Sweden. Sample means and standard deviations of key variables for the five countries are
given in Table A2.
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Table A1.  Variable definitions and collection method
Hourly wage Denmark: Tax register information on annual taxable earnings divided by an estimate of hours
worked (calculated from contributions to a pension fund).
Finland: Tax register information on annual taxable earnings divided by normal self-reported
working hours.
Iceland: Employer reported wage rates for individuals.
Norway: Self-reported earnings divided by self-reported hours.
Sweden: Self-reported earnings divided by self-reported hours.
The self-reported information is compared and controlled with annual registers of
earnings of tax declaration.
Educationa) Denmark: Register data from educational institutions.
Finland: Official register data on highest completed educational degree.
Iceland: Not available.
Norway: Register data on highest completed education
Sweden: Self-reported years of schooling.
Experience Denmark: Number of years as wage earner, calculated from pension fund contributions.
Finland: Self-reported years of work experience.
Iceland: Not available.
Norway: Self-reported years of work experience.
Sweden: Self-reported years of work experience.
Seniorityb) Denmark: Calculated from matched plant-worker data.
Finland: Self-reported.
Iceland: Not available.
Norway: Self-reported.
Sweden: Self-reported.
Occupation: 4-5 main categories in each country
Industry: In all four countries 2-digit ISIC industry dummy variables.
Notes: a) The education variable used in the estimations is defined as the total years of schooling. b) Length
of years of the current employment relationship.
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Table A2. Sample mean statistics for the last sample year, private-sector employees
Variables Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
(1991) (1993) (1992) (1993) (1991)
Hourly wages 146.87 63.60 544.56 102.21 83.25
(60.86) (28.65) (43.81) (30.97)
Regional unemployment 9.79 17.45 3.0 5.64 3.02
(2.60) (3.03) (0.87) (0.72)
Municipality unemployment 9.91 19.84 n.a. 5.67 3.17
(2.52) (3.66) (1.21) (1.23)
Education in years 11.38 11.13 n.a. 11.42 11.19
(2.52) (1.87) (2.10) (2.80)
Experience in years 15.59 18.54 n.a. 18.57 18.00
(10.08) (10.42) (11.37) (12.52)
Seniority in years 3.93 10.03 n.a. 9.77 8.99
(3.88) (9.07) (8.83) (9.52)
Gender 0.34 0.45 0.50 0.35 0.35
(0.47) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48)
Blue-collar worker 0.43 0.45 0.74 0.39 0.51
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Union membershipa) 0.84 0.78 1.00 0.53 0.78
(0.37) (0.41) (0.50) (0.42)
Sample size 34,723 1,487 12,799 2,034 1,741
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. a) For Denmark: membership of unemployment insurance funds.
For Iceland: The data stems from the association of Icelandic employers.
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Tables in the text:
Table 1. Basic wage curve results, pooled sample, coefficients for
ln(regional unemployment). Dependent variable: ln(hourly wage).
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
Sector: 80-91 89,91,93 92-96 89, 91, 93 81,91
Private sector Coeff. -0.0629* -0.1022* -0.0290* -0.0610* -0.0515*
(0.0018) (0.0090) (0.0062) (0.0144) (0.0110)
No. obs. 416,314 6738 48,673 5472 3663
Public sector Coeff. -0.0227* -0.0378* n.a. -0.0167 0.0081
(0.0048) (0.0107) (0.0161) (0.0108)
No. obs. 30,039 3872 3465 2981
Public and private Coeff. -0.0508* -0.0797* n.a. -0.0482* -0.0272*
(0.0038) (0.0069) (0.0109) (0.0081)
No. obs. 66,950 10,610 8937 6652
No. of regions 16 13 8 19 24
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. An asterisk indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
The explanatory variables include for Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden years of education,
experience, experience squared, seniority, gender, occupational dummies, industry dummies and year
dummies. For Iceland, the explanatory variables include dummies for seniority, age, gender, industry
and year.
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Table 2. Wage curve results with fixed regional effects, private sector,
coefficients for
 
ln(unemployment). Dependent variable: ln(hourly wage)
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway a) Sweden
Unemployment variable: 80-91 89,91,93 92-96 89, 91, 93 81,91
Regional unempl. rates -0.0011 0.0198 -0.0068 0.0011 0.0313
(0.0060) (0.0183) (0.0087) (0.0235) (0.0322)
Municipal unempl. rates -0.0154* -0.0068 n.a -0.0158 -0.0059
(0.0021) (0.0105) (0.0226) (0.0121)
Commuting area b) -0.0184* -0.0044 n.a -0.0161 0.0059
unemployment rates (0.0042) (0.0132) (0.0269) (0.0211)
No. of observations 416,314 6738 61,640 5516 3664
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. An asterisk indicates significance at the 5 percent level. The
explanatory variables include schooling, experience, experience squared, seniority, gender, occupational
dummies, industry dummies and year dummies. For Iceland the explanatory variables are dummies for
gender, occupations and industry. a) The Norwegian observations of municipality and commuting area
unemployment are from one year only (1989) and cover 2318 observations. b) Commuting areas are
constructed by combining municipalities according to the degree of commuting across municipality
borders.
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Table 3. Wage curve results with fixed regional effects, coefficients
for ln(unemployment). Dependent variable: average regional
ln(wage)
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
Explanatory variable: 80-91 89,91,93 92-96 89,91,93 81,91
Regional unempl. rate -0.0084* -0.0184 -0.0625* 0.0033 0.0121
(0.0035) (0.0270) (0.0250) (0.0213) (0.0365)
No. of observations 192 36 40 57 48
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. An asterisk indicates significance at the 5 percent level. The
explanatory variables include year dummies, region-cross-year specific average years of
schooling, experience, experience squared, seniority, and gender. For Iceland, the controls are
dummies for gender and occupation.
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Table 4. Wage curve results from between-regional variation in average
wage rates, coefficients for means of ln(regional unemployment)
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
Dependent variable: 80-91 89,91,93 92-96 89,91,93 81,91
Average wage level -0.0571 -0.1682* 0.0144 -0.2464* -0.0864*
(0.0679) (0.0556) (0.0849) (0.1009) (0.0302)
Average wage residual a) -0.0719 -0.1357* 0.0070 -0.0987* -0.0585*
(0.0484) (0.0178) (0.0696) (0.0520) (0.0185)
No. of observations 16 13 8 19 24
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. An asterisk indicates significance at the 5 percent level. The regressions
include average log unemployment for the region and a constant. The regression for average wage level
includes the averages of the year dummies as well. a) The residuals are from individual regressions with the
following explanatory variables: year dummies, years of schooling, experience, experience squared,
seniority, gender, occupational dummies and industry dummies. For Iceland the explanatory variables are
dummies for year, gender, occupation, age and industry.
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Table 5. Wage curve estimates along different dimensions, coefficients for
means of ln(regional unemployment)
Dimensions: Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
Panel A:
1. Region specific averages -0.0571 -0.1682* 0.0144 -0.2464* -0.0864*
(Table 4) (0.0679) (0.0556) (0.0849) (0.1009) (0.0302)
2. Fixed region effects -0.0011 0.0198 -0.0068 0.0011 0.0313
(Table 2) (0.0060) (0.0183) (0.0087) (0.0235) (0.0322)
3. “Long term
      regional wage curve”
-0.0560 -0.1880* 0.0212 -0.2475* -0.1177*
(1 minus 2) (0.0682) (0.0585) (0.0853) (0.1036) (0.0441)
Panel B:
1. Aggregate time-series
estimates a)
-0.123* -0.048* n.a. -0.138* -0.170*
(Nymoen et al 1998) (0.036) (0.022) (0.018) (0.058)
2. Fixed region effects -0.0011 0.0198 0.0011 0.0313
(Table 2) (0.0060) (0.0183) (0.0235) (0.0322)
3. “National wage curve” -0.122* -0.068* -0.139* -0.201*
(1 minus 2) (0.036) (0.028) (0.030) (0.066)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. An asterisk indicates significance at the 5 percent level. The standard
errors of the differences are calculated using standard formula for independently distributed variables. a)
The time series estimates are the long-run elasticities reported Nymoen et al (1998). The time series
estimates are from observations from 1960 to 1994 for manufacturing only and includes total
unemployment. Since the specifications of (1) and (2) are not identical, the elasticities reported here do
not correspond exactly to the estimators discussed in the text.
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Table 6. The relation between average regional wages, income, working hours,
and regional unemployment, Denmark, private sector, 1980-91
Dependent variable: Wages Wages Income Income Hours Hours
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged dependent 0.9750* 0.5191* 0.9881* 0.3668* 0.6422* 0.0201
variable (0.0124) (0.0641) (0.0162) (0.0682) (0.0607) (0.0710)
Log unempl. rate -0.0003 -0.0025 -0.0019 -0.0057 -0.0076* -0.0017
(0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0019) (0.0044) (0.0025) (0.0033)
Regional dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
R squared 0.9752 0.9821 0.9603 0.9751 0.4963 0.7326
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. An asterisk indicates significance at the 5 percent level. The dependent
variable and the lagged dependent variable are the regional mean residuals from year-specific OLS log wage
regressions. Controls include schooling, experience, experience squared, seniority, gender, occupational
dummies and industry dummies. The means are calculated for 16 regions over 12 years (i.e., 176 number of
observations) on the basis of 416,314 individual wage observations. The regressions are weighted by the
number of employed workers in the regions, assessed from the sample of individual observations.
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Table 7. Dynamic models for the Nordic countries, private sector.
Dependent variable: ln(regional wage)
Denmark Denmark Denmark Finland Iceland Norway
Explanatory variables: 1980-91 81,83,85 86,88,90 89,91,93 1992-96 89,91,93
Lagged dependent 0.9750* 0.9454* 0.9625* 0.7663* 0.7323* 0.7280*
variable (0.0124) (0.0325) (0.0256) (0.1227) (0.1975) (0.1059)
Calculated one year - 0.9723* 0.9811* 0.8754* - 0.8532*
coefficient (sqrt. coeff) (0.0167) (0.0131) (0.0701) (0.0621)
Log unempl. rate -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0147
(0.0019) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0014) (0.0412) (0.0237)
Regional dummies No No No No No No
No. of observations 176 32 32 32 32 37
R squared 0.9752 0.9417 0.9652 0.3218 0.3218 0.4467
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. An asterisk indicates significance at the 5 percent level. The dependent
variable and the lagged dependent variable are the regional mean residuals from year-specific OLS log wage
regressions. Controls include schooling, experience, experience squared, seniority, gender, occupational
dummies and industry dummies. The regressions are weighted by the number of employed workers in the
regions, assessed from the sample of individual observations. The standard error of the one-year auto-regressive
coefficient to the wage rate is calculated by the delta method.
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Notes:
                                                
i
 Previous studies of the Wage Curve from the Nordic countries include Nicolaisen and
Tranaes (1996) for Denmark, Parjanne (1997) and Pekkarinen (1998) for Finland, Raaum
and Wulfsberg (1996), Longva and Raaum (1998), and Dyrstad and Johansen (1999) for
Norway, and Östros (1990), Edin et al. (1993), and Blomskog (1997) for Sweden.
ii
 In order to keep things simple, we do not distinguish between nominal and real entities
in this section.
iii
 As it can be shown that the between- and within-region variation in the data is
orthogonal, the estimates of /between and / are independent (the same applies for ˆbetween
and ˆ). This implies that the standard error of the difference between them may be
calculated simply as the square root of the sum of the variances of the estimated
coefficients.
iv
 The result for Norway is taken from model 4 in table 7.17, in Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994). The Swedish figure is reported from Edin et al. (1993), see ibid. pp. 355-356.
v
 See the appendix for a description of the data used in this study.
vi
 The standard deviation of wages across regions in the public sector in the Nordic
countries is considerably smaller than the regional dispersion in private sector wages, see
the assessment in the report Albæk et al. (1999).
vii
 The alternative, a feasible GLS estimation of the variance component model, is neither
attempted in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) or in this paper.
viii
 Indeed, the correlation of regional unemployment between two selected years is quite
high, ranging from 0.46 for Norway to 0.9 for Finland.
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ix
 Despite the impressing number of tables in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), this
source does seemingly not contain an assessment of the magnitude of the cross-sectional
variation in wages and unemployment across regions for the US. The positive correlation
do, however, show up in, for example, Table 4.6, where the average unemployment rate
in regions enters with a positive coefficient in a regression with yearly regional wage rates
as the dependent variable and early regional unemployment rates included on the right
hand side.
x
  However, Bell (1997) actually obtains a comparatively small, but significant positive
cross-sectional elasticity for Britain in a regression, which also contains the average
houseprices in the regions.
xi
 In this connection it might be of interest to note, that policy measures aiming at
preventing depopulation of regions remote from the main economic centers in the Nordic
countries have played an important role in these countries.
xii
 However, since the fixed effects regressions on individuals (Table 2) and on regions
(Table 3) did not produce similar results, we are reluctant to draw any strong conclusions
from these results.
xiii
 The models are not exactly identical to those discussed above, since the long-term
model does not include the means of the individual variables. If the average values of the
individual characteristics are correlated with both wages and unemployment, this may
bias the coefficient reported.
xiv
 Note that if we used the fixed effect model from the region-cross-time specifications,
we would obtain an even larger and significantly positive long-run estimate for Iceland.
49
                                                                                                                                                
xv
  It is likely that Table 7.17 in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) contains a printing error
such that the number of regional dummies for the fifth estimate should have been 19
instead of the 18, which is the number of regional dummies according to the table. This
would have made the table compatible with the text, where it is also noted that "The
unemployment rate is measured across 20 regions".
xvi
  For a comparison and discussions of the difference between a pooled sample and a
fixed effect estimation for the US, see for example Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), p.
121-122, and for a statement about the positive long-run wage-unemployment
relationship across US regions, see for example p. 181.
xvii
 Actually, it seems as though deleting regional dummies have only been applied for
two other countries in order to produce the preferred estimates in Blanchflower and
Oswald (1995). In the case of Austria the main effect of dropping 5 out of 8 regional
dummies is an increase in the precision of the point estimate, there is only a minor change
in the wage-unemployment elasticity from -0.08 to -0.09, see Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994), p. 316. However, in the case of Holland, dropping 4 out of 11 dummies changes
the point estimate from an insignificant -0.06 to a significant wage-unemployment
elasticity on -0.17, see Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), p. 323-324.
xviii
 Our evidence is supported by the recent study by Dyrstand and Johansen (1999). They
include both regional and aggregate unemployment rates in a wage equation for regional
Norwegian manufacturing wages, and conclude that the effect of unemployment on
wages mainly arises through central settlements rather than through wage setting at the
firm level.
xix
  It should be noted, that the coefficients of the wage and hours equations do not add up
to the coefficients in the income equations, which is the case in a static specification
where the lagged wage level is omitted.
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xx
 See the analytic results in Nickell (1981). The number of observations in the cross-
sectional dimension is so small that it makes no sense to apply a GMM method in an
attempt to correct the estimates for the bias.
xxi
  The specifications closest to the ones in Table 6 in the present paper, column (1) and
(2), yields a coefficient to the lagged wage rate on 0.9753 without fixed regional effects
and 0.7155 including the fixed regional effects, which is not far away from the Danish
results.
xxii
 We do not present results when regional fixed effects are included. With the small
number of years in the present table, the bias is so large that the coefficients cannot be
trusted.
xxiii
 We only show the result from two different experiments from Denmark 81-85 and 86-
90, but all other possible four-year combinations give very similar results with this
specification.
xxiv
 The variance of the one-year lagged coefficients to the wage rate is calculated from
the two-year lagged coefficients by application of the delta method. The formula is var(λ)
= var(λ2)/4λ2, where λ is the coefficient to the wage level lagged one year.
xxv
  The standard errors are valid under the null, no first order autoregressive process, and
the distance from the coefficients to one is either less than or close to two standard errors.
